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Abstract:  In opposition to US policy today, during the 1950’s, the United States was a strong, even the primary supporter, of a supranational European defense force with the goal of creating a European power bloc.  Ironically, French distrust of the integration process killed the EDC.  Moreover, the failure of the French to ratify the EDC was a major step on the road to mistrust between France and the US that continues to exist today. 
	Jacques Delors declared the Europeans had "a rendezvous with history".​[1]​  In December 1990, in Rome, the EC​[2]​ formally announced its joint pursuit of a closer federation containing a common foreign and security policy (CFSP).  Alan Clark, the British minister for defense procurement explained that Europe needed "something slimmer, less set than NATO, something capable of faster response."​[3]​  After all, Clark asked, what exactly were the 4,000 military and civilian employees doing at NATO headquarters these days?  The Secretary-General of the Western European Union (WEU), Wim van Eekelen, a former Dutch defense minister, said he would not need such a vast bureaucratic structure to maintain the type of a European defense force he proposed which would consist of a brigade of four to five thousand soldiers from each country with their own staffs, artillery, and logistical support.  A single European general would have command.  Such a force, van Eekelen reminded, could have been used in the Persian Gulf.​[4]​
	The Gulf War had indeed underlined the need for a common foreign and security policy in the eyes of many Europeans.  Without a unified voice in the international arena, Europe was invisible, but as the British pointed out:  "Foreign policy needs security and [there is] no security policy without defence."​[5]​  In a speech given on 7 March 1991 at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Jacques Delors stressed that if the Community were to contribute to the new world order, it must accept that this presupposes participation, where necessary, in forces which are given the task of ensuring respect for international law.
To illustrate these arguments, let me turn once more to the Gulf Crisis.  It is true that the very first day -- 2 August 1990 -- the Community took the firm line expected of it.  It confirmed the commitment of its member states to enforce sanctions, the first line of dissuasion against aggressors.  However, once it became obvious that the situation would have to be resolved by armed combat, the Community had neither the institutional machinery nor the military force which would have allowed it to act as a community.  Are the Twelve prepared to learn from this experience?​[6]​
French foreign minister Roland Dumas asked "Could [the EC] have done more? Clearly not!  Can it hope to do more in the future? Clearly yes!" ​[7]​
	This European foray into security affairs was not wholly supported by the United States.  Although George Ball and Henry Kissenger,​[8]​ among others on one side of the Atlantic, consistently called for an equal partnership, for example Kennedy’s dumbbell approach, the imminent danger of attack from the Soviet Union precluded experimentation with the Atlantic security structure.   However, the end of the Cold War opened the door to what President George H. W. Bush dubbed the “new world order”.  Nevertheless, German unification and quick movement towards a common foreign and security policy frightened many in the Bush administration.  Washington interpreted this push for a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) as a way to push the U.S. out of Europe.  This skepticism continued under Clinton as well.  In her famous speech, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright warned that such a defense policy or force must not violate the three “D’s”:  diminution of NATO, duplication of NATO or, discrimination of NATO members.​[9]​  More recently, the French-German proposal for a separate EU defense command in April 2003 made Colin Powell “a little nervous”.​[10]​  
Ironically, in 1953, the United States’ policy was to get France to commit to a supranational army in the European Defense Community (EDC).  During the early 1950’s, the French proposed the EDC, based on the European Coal and Steel Community, as a way to allow Germany to rearm under a supra-national structure.   Despite American pressure and incentives for and despite being a French brain-child, the EDC died an ignominious death in 1954 at the hands of the French parliament.   Using newly declassified documents from the Eisenhower Presidential library, this paper uncovers American and French perspectives and motivations from 1952 to 1954.  In opposition to US policy today, during the 1950’s, the United States was a strong, even the primary supporter, of a supranational European defense force with the goal of creating a European power bloc.  Ironically, French mistrust of the integration process killed the EDC.  Moreover, the failure of the French to ratify the EDC was a major step on the road to mistrust between France and the US that continues to exist today.  
	
The EDC: The End of Franco-American Trust
In the aftermath of World War II, the United States and Europe had to create new security structures to stabilize the continent.   The Brussels Treaty of 1948 singled out Germany as the enemy to control.   The 1949 Washington Treaty that established NATO excluded Germany.  However, after the Korean War, the threat of communism seemed more immediate than ever.  Containment was the policy.  A rearmed Germany was deemed necessary to deter the Soviets, and the Eisenhower administration pressured the other European countries to allow it.  German soil had to be defended; the Germans were willing to do it, and capable of it.  Germany was reindustrializing itself at a rapid pace, and, becoming more aware of its bargaining power, was pushing to have its essential sovereignty restored.  After seven years of occupation by four powers, the conclusion of the Japanese peace treaty, and the de facto revision of the onerous provisions of the Italian peace treaty, it seemed a reasonable request.  For military reasons, Prime Minister Churchill supported the move: "We [can]not go on for three more years without a German army; even with it the front would still be thinly held.  But it would be a deterrent to the Soviets...."​[11]​  Furthermore, the resuscitation "of a Germany military force which in turn would divert a part of Germany's economic activity from competition with the United Kingdom into rearmament,"​[12]​ would also be very beneficial to the British.
	Considering that France had been invaded by Germany three times in fewer than one hundred years, very understandably, the French government was reluctant to allow Germany to rearm.  As a compromise, the French proposed the European Defense Community based on the European Coal and Steel Community, which would allow Germany to rearm, but under a supra-national structure.  All members, except Germany, would be allowed to have national militaries outside the European Army.  Adenauer, as well as Eisenhower, was not pleased by the unequal status given Germany in this forum.  Once France dropped this requirement, the U.S. supported it wholeheartedly.  
	While the U.S. asked the question: "what is the best way to guarantee European security", the French were asking "what is the best way to safeguard the interests of France?"  From the American vantage point, Germany was a defeated power, and in comparison to the Soviets, hardly a threat.  Certainly, if Europe were to defend itself from the communist menace, the Europeans would have to put up a strong united front.  From the global perspective, perhaps communism was indeed the most dangerous threat to the free world.  However, it was not for the French whose communist party played an active role in its democratic government.  For France, unrest throughout its empire and a rearmed Germany were much more immediate threats.  Asking France to give up its national army and to put it along side its eternal enemy's, under supra-national control, while France was fighting a war in Indo-China and combating unrest in North Africa, was simply too much.  Although another solution to German rearmament was ultimately agreed upon, this difference of perspective would plague European defense talks forty years later when France and the U.S. would continue to speak past each other.
The American Perspective:  Integration so the U.S. can “sit back and relax”
	On February 19, 1952 in Lisbon, the delegations of The Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Italy submitted a draft proposing the establishment of a European Defense Community with the final aim of "merging, under common supra-national institutions, the armed forces of member states with a view to permanently ensuring the defence of Europe and to safeguarding peace against all threats, both present and future."​[13]​  At the disposal of the Supreme Atlantic Command, the European Defense Forces would be comprised of units from the different member states on a partly conscript, partly volunteer level, organized, standardized, and trained so they could function as homogenous and effective entities.  These forces would be allowed to undertake international missions, for example in Berlin, Austria, and Korea.  The forces, the size of which had not yet been agreed upon, would depend upon supra-national political institutions along the same lines as the Coal and Steel Community which included a Council of Ministers, a General Assembly, a Board of Commissioners, and a Court of Justice.  The forces would be financed by a common budget.  
	As has always been a key interest of the United States, the EDC was a way to save money on its defense expenditures:  "It cannot be overemphasized that Eisenhower was very concerned with the burden of defense expenditures on the U.S. economy.  He seemed to have a stark vision of an economic disaster, which he foresaw as a consequence of continued defense spending at the tempo which characterized the latter Truman years."​[14]​  At the lowest price, and with the fewest men possible, the U.S. needed to defend Europe, deter the Soviets, and make sure that the European countries, especially Germany, were firmly in the Western camp and not neutral.  The EDC was an ideal solution.
	Of utmost concern to the Americans was the threat from the east: "The U.S. wants a European defense establishment, complementing that of the U.S., able to help support a foreign policy in line with U.S. objectives with respect to the Soviet bloc."​[15]​  The European Defense Community would be NATO's European pillar: the formidable first line of defense against the red menace.  Germany's potential military might channeled into a European army was of grave concern to the Soviets.  Soviet Foreign Affairs Minister Molotov stated to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that "the Soviet Union had great apprehensions concerning the European Army, and inquired whether [Dulles] did not feel it was setting one part of Europe off against the other."​[16]​  He later even hinted to the French that "Indochina peace might be bought for [sic] price of concessions on Germany and EDC."​[17]​  One might add here that Dulles eloquently explained to Molotov that:
he could understand very fully the preoccupations of the Soviet Union; that there were people who believed that the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the countries allied with it, which were considerably larger than those of Western Europe, were directed against the West and constituted a threat to other countries.  He personally did not believe this, since he felt the Soviet leader had created this force for defense, and he, therefore, hoped the Soviet Union could take the same attitude toward the EDC.​[18]​
	Not only would the EDC keep the Soviets in check, but it would also anchor the Germans firmly to the west.  Obviously, the West Germans would have inclinations toward their brethren on the other side of their divided nation.  If the German people were not to identify with their brethren in the East, they had to have a sense of belonging with the West Europeans.  Integrating the West German military force to that of Europe would not only guard against a new-born German militarism, but would help the Germans both to identify more with the West and to know that they belonged with the West.  Moreover, the EDC was a stepping stone to NATO membership.  Time was of the essence.  Dulles explained that "while the West was floundering in indecision as to the best means of defending itself, the Russians might well decide to take a long chance and make a really attractive offer to the Germans. This might take the form of an offer to permit the re-unification of Germany coupled with a very favorable trade treaty.  The result of such an offer was not happy to contemplate."​[19]​  
	The EDC would also defend against cancerous neutralism:
We used to say that the 'shield' in NATO would protect Europe from the damages and losses incident to invasion pending the outcome of the global battle between the U.S. and the USSR.  In the atomic age, it is now becoming increasingly apparent to people and their leaders that active defense in Europe would probably elicit far more atomic destruction and loss than would neutrality or even submission to temporary occupation.  Neutrality, therefore, becomes an attractive course of action when this fact is coupled with the realization that, even in the event of total war between the U.S. and the USSR, such a course would detract little from the Free World prospects for victory.​[20]​
In this respect, the U.S. was in a "Catch 22" position.  To feel truly committed to the Western cause, the European nations would need to play a more active and independent role in their defense.  Of course, more freedom for the Europeans meant less control for the Americans.  Considering Germany's divided status, "a separate and politically strong unified European power bloc particularly one in which Germany was the leading member, might even under moderate leaders develop a neutralist foreign policy toward the Soviet bloc, as well as toward other areas, inconsistent with the interests of the Atlantic Community."​[21]​  In this way, EDC was the perfect solution.  The 'European' army would be under firm NATO (i.e. American) control.
	Moreover, European integration on all levels, especially defense integration, once proven, would allow for substantial burden-sharing.  In his NSC meetings, Eisenhower strongly encouraged his cabinet to endorse European integration both privately and publicly:  “with even greater emphasis the President repeated his view on the desirability of developing Western Europe a third great power bloc, after which development the United States would be permitted to sit back and relax somewhat.”​[22]​  
	Despite feeling “a little nervous” today, under the Eisenhower administration, US policy was to create in Europe a new power bloc to share world policing responsibilities.  The Eisenhower administration consciously intended to make Europe a partner in world affairs.
The French Perspective:  France as the Dowry for a Unified Europe
	The Americans were very enthusiastic about European integration, but the French were not.  Although the French came up with the idea of a European Defense Community, they soon lost enthusiasm for it.  Churchill never liked the "sludgy amalgam" as he called it, but supported it because he thought it was the only way that the French would swallow German rearmament:  "I do not blame the French for rejecting EDC but only for inventing it."​[23]​  First, the French were uneasy about giving up their national army: "To federate an army like that of [our] country almost one thousand years old, was not an easy thing,"​[24]​  True, the FRG's military would be tied up in a European Army, but the French were not confident that  they could counter-balance a more active and powerful Germany.  Considering the unrest in North Africa and the fighting in Indo-China, in French eyes, the EDC was like opening a third front:  "French indecision and unreasoning appeals for large scale U.S. aid stem largely from their feared inability to continue the bloody and expensive fight in Indo-China and also to match potential German contributions to European defense."​[25]​  Germany was still seen as an adversary, another force to be controlled.  
	French Prime Minister Joseph Laniel and French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault tried in vain to explain to the Americans the French perspective on the EDC.  The EDC required a fifty-year commitment to a former enemy whose Eastern frontiers were unknown.  The French worried about the weakening of the British and American commitment with some asking whether the EDC “would merely replace the troops of old allies by those of an old enemy….”​[26]​
	Moreover, the Saar issue had yet to be resolved:  “France was being asked to provide a dowry for unified Europe.  That dowry was the Saar.” Although Europeanization was seen as the answer, the French were against such a solution:  “as the unification of Europe proceeded, the bonds with France would slacken.”​[27]​  Bidault also explained “that while France wishes to build Europe, it does not wish to be engulfed by it and thereby lose its individual personality so that the Continental character of France would no longer be considered except through the European Community, of which it would be a part but not necessarily a spokesman.”​[28]​  
	Perhaps most importantly, the French saw the EDC as a way of pushing itself away from its place after World War II as one of the leaders:  
The position of France on the Standing Group could not be questioned.  The creation of the European Defense Community could not separate France and the other territories and countries who were marching with her along the road to progress from the association of the Big Three.  This was the first point.  M. Bidault said that he could not imagine for a second that because France had entered a European Community it would be a European who would sit in the place he had the honor to occupy.  This possibility must be definitely excluded.  This was the first danger, but there was another.  If the European Community were set up, the unintegrated powers (U.S.-UK) might consider that the problem had been satisfactorily solved and seek to pass the new community certain political and military responsibilities.​[29]​
In Bidault’s eyes, the EDC was a zero-sum game:  to give Europe these powers and responsibilities would be to take the powers and responsibilities from France alone. 
	To allay such fears among those in the National Assembly, Laniel and Bidault asked that the Americans and British make public assurances that they would provide forces to the EDC:  Bidault “believed it would only be possible to enter EDC with the knowledge that the British and Americans would stand as comrades along side of them.  If this were not possible, the French people might draw back from the abyss, which was wide indeed … and would harken to this memory of past sufferings and the bitterness of abandonment.”​[30]​  Eisenhower explained that Congress would not make such a commitment without France first making the commitment to the EDC.  Churchill responded that they had done all they could; EDC was a French problem that required a French solution. Britain’s troops could remain in France only as long as America’s.  In a thinly veiled threat to pull UK forces out of France, he stated “if the EDC were rejected, the British would then have to do their utmost to fight to the death in their own island [by pulling out their troops from the Continent] and this they would not hesitate to do to the best of their ability.”​[31]​  He continued saying if the EDC were rejected, “This would indeed be a frightful disaster for Europe could be quickly undermined and suborned by the Russian Communist advance and then, if a general war followed, it was very likely that they would never succeed in reviving the civilization and culture of Western Europe and of France.”​[32]​ In other words, Churchill tried to convince Laniel and Bidault that the EDC was the only way to safeguard French culture.  
	In American eyes, the ratification would make or break France.  In a telegram, Dulles stated: "If in next several months France rejects EDC, or is unable to take action on it, manifestly it will be impossible for United States to maintain fiction France is capable of role of leadership in European and world affairs when France, by its very action killing EDC when there is no (repeat no) acceptable alternative solution for Europe, will have demonstrated its incapacity for such leadership [sic]."​[33]​  Using the carrot and stick approach, Dulles threatened France’s new Prime Minister Pierre Mendes-France (Laniel’s successor following his defeat in the French parliamentary elections) with the loss of funds stating that the American public would no longer tolerate a delay over French ratification, and that if German rearmament had to be arranged without an EDC, Congress would simply stop appropriating money for NATO.​[34]​  As for the 'carrot', the U.S. offered the French aid in their struggle in Indo-China.  In exchange for U.S. financial and political backing (almost a billion dollars worth​[35]​), Mendes-France promised to get the treaty ratified.   
	Diplomatically, the Eisenhower administration gave as much support as possible.  In a public statement, revised by the French, Eisenhower stated publicly “In consonance with its policy of full and continuing support for the maintenance of the integrity and unity of the European Defense Community, the United States will regard any action from whatever quarter which threatens that integrity or unity as a threat to the security of the United States.”​[36]​  In addition, in acquiescence to French implorations, John Foster Dulles allowed General Smith to accompany France and represent the United States at the Geneva peace conference on Indochina.  In reaction, in the NSC, “Senator Humphrey expressed the opinion that the most important gain that Secretary Dulles had achieved by virtue of his visit to Paris was to put Mendes-France under obligation to the United States, particularly with respect to Germany.  If Mendes-France proved to be honest, and grasped the assistance we were giving him on Indochina, there was hope for a decent German settlement.”​[37]​
	Evidently, the support the U.S. gave to Indo-China was insufficient.  In the spring of 1954, the Americans refused to come to the aid of the French at Dien Bien Phu.  Sherwood argues that the French National Assembly rejected EDC in 1954 as a warning to the United States as a sign that if France could not fulfill its ambitions in Asia, the U.S. would not be allowed to fulfill its own in Europe.​[38]​
	Perhaps, this was one factor in the National Assembly, but many more were at play.   Proponents of ratification argued that the treaty was the lesser of two evils.  The other options held the dangers of unbridled German power and irredentism, of American withdrawal or lessened support, and finally of Soviet aggression.  Opponents of the treaty called its adherents "visionaries, amateurs, fools, or even traitors and grave diggers of France."​[39]​  Charles de Gaulle, although not in government, was stridently against EDC and the loss of France's national army.  His party in the National Assembly was split.  The French Communists were moderately successful raising doubts as to German and American intentions, and portrayed the Soviets as peaceful.  Adenauer publicly stated that the EDC was the best way of restoring unity.   In addition, the 1952 American presidential campaign made rolling back the Soviets a foreign policy objective.  These statements combined with Stalin's death and Malenkov's "peace offensive" only brought more suspicion to the EDC and credence to French Communist claims.​[40]​
	Perhaps more importantly, in a memorandum from the American embassy in Paris, the second secretary saw the EDC as a victim of an atmosphere of tremendous national inferiority in which the EDC debates took place.
One of the most important, though usually unspoken, arguments against EDC had long been the belief that in any community including France and Germany the latter would inevitably gain the upper hand because the Germans are more capable soldiers, organizers, businessmen and politicians.​[41]​
Washington saw this setback as a great tragedy because it was "a psychological and political defeat for the proponents of European unity from which they might not recover for two or three years if at all.​[42]​
Ramifications of the EDC Defeat:  The Franco-American Split
	After the rejection of EDC, Germany's rearmament came with its accession to NATO.  Mendes-France actually preferred this arrangement because U.S. and UK power and influence would keep reins on the Germans.  Despite EDC's failure, both the French and the Americans kept their faith in the potential for European integration.  For the Americans, as always, European integration was a signal to the Soviets of Atlantic resolve and unity.  However, U.S. support for integration went even further:  "Except where its vital interests are concerned, the U.S. should avoid pursuing any course contrary to the enlightened self-interest of Western Europe.  To pursue such a course would be to deny Western Europe the rights that the U.S. insists upon for itself.  Such a position would be difficult to defend and in all probability politically injurious to the long range interest of the U.S.[.]"​[43]​  Throughout the sixties, the U.S. kept its word and welcomed steps toward political union.  Kissinger wrote, “As late as 1962, Under Secretary of State Ball warned against the danger of treating the Common Market simply as an economic enterprise and opposed efforts of the Scandanavian countries and Austria to enter it without making a commitment to political unity.”​[44]​
	However, US policy towards France did change.  The rejection of the EDC was a turning point in Franco-American relations.  Before the rejection of the EDC, the U.S. saw France as “having the role of leadership on the European continent and a partner’s share in world leadership with the United States and the United Kingdom.”​[45]​  However, a rejection of the EDC would mean that, although allies, neither side could, in the future, trust the other.  As early as February 1954, Dulles wrote Eisenhower that 
if France acts negatively on EDC, United States will have to do its best to salvage what it can from wreckage of our policy toward Europe and to reshape its policy.  In particular, this will mean coordinating out policy with United Kingdom so that at least United States and United Kingdom can act together to take important decision on matters relating to European and world affairs.  Whether one likes it or not, inevitably under such circumstances, United States and United Kingdom by necessity forced on them by France, will revert to that form of bilateral cooperation which existed during war years and which by its very nature would exclude France from an equal place.​[46]​
	Indeed, after rejection, the British firmly sided with the Americans and saw France as loose cannon whose waywardness had the power to undermine European security arrangements and open an opportunity for Russia.  In a meeting with Dulles, Churchill “expressed his relief that the ‘EDC Tomfoolery’ was over.  He said he had only supported it because you [Eisenhower] wanted it but had never had faith in it.  Now we could get German armies to march by our side instead of having a ‘sludgy amalgam’.” At this point in Churchill’s eyes, Germany was seen as a more reliable partner than France.  In the same memorandum, Dulles tells Eisenhower of his mistrust of France:  
It seems that Mendes-France has been most evasive.  He may be working out his own project on terms which profess to provide for sovereignty of Germany in NATO by attaching conditions unacceptable to Germany, U.S. and perhaps others.  He could present these French terms at prospective London conference and, if they are not accepted, attempt to pass blame to others.  This was his Brussels conference tactic.  I find evidence of a rising tide of concern about Mendes-France’s Russian contacts.  He has killed EDC at least for now and he may be out to kill German admission to NATO.​[47]​
	The feelings were mutual.  The weak French Fourth Republic was plagued by never-ending foreign policy crises beginning with the EDC, Indo-China, Algeria, and finally Suez.  In each case, the Americans seemed not to side with the French government.  Suez was the final straw:  French Foreign Minister Antoine Pinay called it the final nail in the coffin of French-American relations.  Interestingly, this move ultimately pushed France to the cause of European integration that the U.S. so strongly supported.  However, under the Fifth Republic, European integration would be on French terms and under French leadership.  So strident was de Gaulle on French independence that he removed France from the military aspect of NATO in 1966 driving yet another wedge between his country and the US.​[48]​
Conclusions:  The Ironies of Franco-American Relations Today
	The strength of America's convictions on European integration has not been tested until today.  In the fifties, it was the French who were asked to make the sacrifice, not the Americans, and in the forty years that followed, the Cold War reinforced the status quo in terms of defense arrangements.  However, this was not necessarily in America's interest.  During the Cold War, many of the U.S. predictions were realized.  The threat of nuclear war did promote neutrality led by the Germans starting with Ostpolitik in the sixties and continuing into the eighties when a total of two million people demonstrated across Europe against the U.S. and nuclear weapons in 1983.​[49]​  Ultimately, Ostpolitik was reconciled with American policy with its pursuit of detente in the seventies, but it nevertheless demonstrates a divergence of Western interests and a less than unified political front.
	This divergence was serious enough for David Calleo to predict the demise of a static Atlantic Alliance in his book Beyond American Hegemony in 1987.  Before the Alliance could change, its framework changed first with the breech of the Berlin Wall in 1989.  The end of the cold war coincided with and contributed to an atmosphere of "Europhoria" and EC integration.  Now that the threat from the east was gone, and European cooperation intensified, a change in European defense policy was possible. 
	Just as under the EDC, there are many advantages to be had with a common European defence.  For a long time, the U.S. has been crying for burden-sharing within NATO.  A European defense structure would mean a reduction in monetary and manpower costs for the U.S..  Since 1990, the U.S. military presence in Europe has declined by two-thirds from a high of over 300,000 to under 100,000 today.  Of course, the Americans would provide reinforcements and help in deployment in a time of crisis.  In a research report for the Congress, Guicherd asserted: "Decreasing the forward deployment component and increasing the reinforcement component in the U.S. contribution would significantly reduce the cost of the U.S. role in NATO."​[50]​  The end result is a greater defense burden and a greater say for European members.
	As a consequence of a more balanced Atlantic partnership, both governments and local populations might well be more amenable to working with Americans and their installations: "This presence and easy access to European facilities is essential to the defense of U.S. security interest beyond the borders of Europe.  The quick success of the Gulf operation was due not only to the ability of the United States to draw on its substantial forces in Europe, bit also to the availability in Europe of a large number of air and naval bases, and to the willingness of the Europeans to let U.S. forces use their military and civilian infrastructures."​[51]​
	Despite the logic of such a plan and assurances from both sides, the Americans and French have continued to look upon each other with suspicion.  In Washington today, a common view is that fifty years of living in security beneath the NATO umbrella has turned Europe into a continent of 'lotus eaters', unappreciative of American sacrifices or leadership in dealing with world crises.  As Congressman Henry Hyde (R-IL) put it, peace, prosperity and NATO have "created a beneficent, but artificial, environment so secure that its beneficiaries believe it to be self-sustaining." Hyde goes so far as to argue that the Europeans' lack of support of American security policy is due to their living in a "cocoon".​[52]​  Robert Kagan simply argues that the US can no longer count on European support as they live on different planets:  “on major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus. … When it comes to setting national priorities, determining threats, defining challenges, and fashioning and implementing foreign and defense policies, the United States and Europe have parted ways.”​[53]​  
	The US and the Europeans have not parted ways.  Instead, the European Security and Defense Policy is a reincarnation of the same problems brought about at the end of World War II.  These problems never went away, but were buried by the Cold War.  When the conditions were right, the same issues rose to the forefront again.  What is most significant is that both sides of the Atlantic Alliance were willing to try for change.  Such change does not occur in a vacuum.  Both attempts at a new defense structure were proposed at the beginning of a new era (for the EDC, at the beginning of the cold war, for Maastricht, the beginning of the post-cold war period), after a trauma, (the Korean War, the Gulf war), and with a change in the status of Germany, (first its rearmament, and second, its unification).  Both the EDC and the Maastricht proposals were said to be absolutely imperative to the continuance of European integration, and both met with opposition.  Another constant has been U.S. and French perspectives and interests.  The U.S. is still most concerned with the best way to guarantee European security and its place in the world, and France wants to promote its grandeur through European integration.  
	The failure of the EDC reinforced the special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom.  In American eyes, the French rejection of the EDC was also a rejection of its responsibilities as one of the world’s policemen.   No longer seen as an equal, after the EDC, the United States stopped consulting with France, but continued to do so with Great Britain.  This rejection of France as a world player, ironically, forced France into both Germany’s and the EC’s arms.  Today, French Foreign Minister Hubert Vederine calls the United States a “hyperpower” that requires a power (i.e. Europe) to balance its worldwide influence.  As leader of the European member states, France could regain its position as equal player in world affairs with regards to the US.  
	True, the Maastricht defense proposals are less drastic than the EDC propositions, but both require the release of troops to the command of a supra-national body (under some circumstances​[54]​).  History is the great differentiating factor.  The devastation of World War II was not far behind the Europeans on a continent divided into two hostile camps.  Certainly in France, there was a feeling of inferiority.  Maastricht negotiations were held in an atmosphere of 'Europhoria'.  The cold war has been 'won'.  Unfortunately, this American mistrust of the Europeans, especially the French, has stymied European integration.  Dividing Europe into integrationists and Atlanticists and into “new” Europe and “old” Europe divides resolve.  As a result, while the EDC crisis was resolved in a matter of months with German accession to NATO, the ESDP “crisis” has been going on for a full fifteen years.  Neither side is willing to trust the other fully.  When the French and the Americans come to an agreement with regard to European security, then the crisis will be solved.  
	Today, as clearly stated in the EU Security Strategy, the Europeans seek the same relationship today envisioned by Eisenhower:
The EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin Plus, enhance the operational capability of the EU and provide the framework for the strategic partnership between the two organisations in crisis management. This reflects our common determination to tackle the challenges of the new century. …

The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world. Our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA. This is an additional reason for the EU to build up further its capabilities and increase its coherence.​[55]​
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